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position of sanctions. 
 
Key words: Sanctions, Economic, Russia, Banking industry, ROE 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  
Sanctions , Economics , Russiaa , Banking Industry, ROE  
Number of pages:  
Language: English 
Date of acceptance:  
                                                            
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 Background Information ................................................................................................ 6 
1.2 Diplomatic measures ..................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Individual restrictive measures ...................................................................................... 7 
1.4 Moscow responds to expanded sanctions .................................................................... 7 
1.5 Research aim ................................................................................................................ 8 
1.6 Research question......................................................................................................... 8 
1.7 Information and empirical basis ..................................................................................... 9 
2 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 9 
2.1 Research method .......................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 What is ROE ................................................................................................................ 11 
2.3 How ROE works .......................................................................................................... 11 
3 Theoretical framework ....................................................................................... 13 
3.1 The concept and types of sanctions ............................................................................ 13 
3.2 Evolution of Sanctions.................................................................................................... 15 
3.3 How Effective Sanctions .............................................................................................. 16 
4 The state of the banking system of Russia before the sanctions .................. 22 
4.1 Key numbers of banking sector ................................................................................... 22 
4.2 Biggest banks ROE ..................................................................................................... 24 
5 Sanctions Against Russia ................................................................................. 26 
5.1 A brief description of Russian banks under the sanctions is given below:.................. 29 
5.2 Non sanction Banks..................................................................................................... 31 
6 The state of banking system of Russia after the sanctions ............................ 33 
6.1 Sberbank ROE – Return on Equity ............................................................................. 35 
6.2 Gazprom bank ROE -Return on Equity ....................................................................... 36 
7 discussion and Conclusion .............................................................................. 38 
8 List of references ............................................................................................... 41 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. HOW ROE WORKS _____________________________________________________________ 12 
TABLE 2. CASES OF REGISTERED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1911-2000 SOURCE: HUFBAUER & SCOTT & 
ELLIOT _________________________________________________________________________ 18 
TABLE 3.. SUSSESSFUL SANCTIONS                                        SOURCE: HOFBAUER, SCHOTT, ELLIOT ______ 19 
TABLE 4. SUCCESS INDEX                                                        SOURCE: HUFBOUER, SCHOTT, ELLIOTT _____ 21 
TABLE 5.RATIO OF BANKING SECTOR PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO RUSSIA'S GDP AND BANKING 
SECTOR AS-SETS 2009–2013                                                  SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA ___ 22 
TABLE 6. DYNAMIC OF SBERBANK KEY FIGURES OVER THE PAST FIVE-YEAR   SOURCE: FINANCIAL 
REPORTS OF SBERBANK ___________________________________________________________ 24 
TABLE 7. PROFITABILITY INDICATORS FOR GROUP OF BANKS        SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA 25 
TABLE 8. RETURN ON EQUITY OF BANKS UNDER THE SANCTION   SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS FROM 
INFORMATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS OF BANKS IN TABLE 7. _____________________________ 35 
TABLE 9. RETURN ON EQUITY OF NONE SANCTION BANKS SOURCE: OWN CALCULATIONS RELIED ON 
INFORMATION FROM ANNUAL REPORTS OF BANKS IN TABLE 10 _________________________ 35 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.. RUBLE TO DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE      SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA ......................... 23 
FIGURE 2. DYNAMIC OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN RUSSIA 2000-2013   SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF 
RUSSIA ............................................................................................................................................... 24 
FIGURE 4.EVOLUTION OF BRENT OIL PRICE (USD/BBL.) SOURCE: INVESDTING.COM (2016) .................... 34 
FIGURE 5. ROE INDICATOR SOURCE: BLOOMBERG (2014) ......................................................................... 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
6 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background Information 
The European Union implemented restrictive measures on oligarchs who are close to Pres-
ident Putin, and frozen their assets in Europe, imposed travel bans for them and other indi-
viduals who are directly or indirectly related to the situation in Crimea. 
 
The US and EU have imposed a list of economic sanctions against Russia. Firstly sanctions 
were imposed by USA in March 2014; they froze the assets of Russian ruling party mem-
bers and close friends of Putin, and made travel restrictions for them, European Union also 
interrupted their activities in visa issues-discussion and it was suspended, all kind of dip-
lomatic cooperation with Russia went down to a very minor level. (Tahir Ozturk, Oz Turk, 
June 2015)  
USA added more sanctions in April and increased the ban restrictions on more people from 
Putin’s circle, The EU added more sanctions and expanded the list of those who are some-
how connected to annexation of Crimea. Firstly, EU restricted those officials from business 
activities in Europe and secondly added travel restrictions on officials directly or indirectly 
related to annexation of Crimea. (The Washington Post, Karen DeYoung & Michael Birn-
baum, April 28, 2014) 
 
The EU implemented different kind of sanctions  
 
• Diplomatic pressure  
• Individual restrictions and travel bans  
• Economic sanctions to Russia  
• Ban for cooperating with Crimea for any country 
 
The G8 was converted to G7 after Russia’s actions in Ukraine it was excluded from further 
participation in it and it was agreed by EU not to have this kind of diplomatic meetings 
with Russia anymore. 
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1.2 Individual restrictive measures 
150 people and 38 entities are case to an asset freeze and travel restriction because their 
behavior threaten Ukraine’s national principle, and independence. The prohibitive 
measures were introduced in March 2014. They were last extended in September 2017 until 
15 March 2018. 
 
The European Union, and The United States passionately condemned Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea and does not admit it as a part of Russia. Since Russia didn’t make any changes 
in its political behavior, the EU appointed the travel restrictions and finance freezes against 
people engaged in actions of annexation of Crimea on 17 March. 
 
In attendance of Russian Federation behavior damaging the situation in Ukraine, the Euro-
pean Union appointed economic sanctions in July 2014 and added new sanctions in Sep-
tember 2014 again. In March 2015, the European Council associated the period of those 
economic restrictions to the complete fulfillment of agreements made in Minsk (Council 
of the European Union, 21.11. 2017). 
1.3 Moscow responds to expanded sanctions 
Putin’s spokesman said on Thursday it was “Unacceptable” for the United States to impose 
sanctions on Russia and warned Moscow would respond in kind to U.S. measures meant 
to punish Putin’s Allies. Spokesman Dmitry Pskov said the Kremlin was studying the list 
of 20 more Russians hit with U.S. visa bans, and asset freezes. “The appearance of some 
names on the list causes nothing but extreme perplexity,” Pskov said. “But no matter what 
the names are, the practice of (issuing sanctions) lists is unacceptable for us. “In any case, 
Russian’s reaction to these lists will be based on the principle of reciprocity and will not 
be long in coming” (CBC News, 2014 Crimea Crisis leads to further sanctions, posted 
Mart 20, 2014). 
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1.4 Research aim  
There are different thoughts about the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on Russia. Some 
politicians claim that sanctions are not as productive as they are supposed to be, but no one 
denies that sanctions make financial pressure on Russia, and they are reasonable alternative 
to war. Thus, the research will concentrate more on financial institutions, especially on the 
banking industry of Russia. 
 
The aim of the thesis research is to measure the influence of sanctions on the banking sector 
of Russia. To accomplish this aim following tasks should be decided: 
• Define the structure of sanctions in general; 
• To get real picture of the popular author and get their idea, whether the sanctions 
are affective or not; 
• Detailed year to year analysis of the data of sanctioned and non-sanctions banks; 
• Plan a reasonable and extensive assessment of the influence of sanctions on the 
banking industry by using (ROE) ratio formula. 
• Develop methodological approaches to assess the liquidity state of the banking sys-
tem, as one of the key indicators, after the imposition of sanctions; 
• Build a model to assess the state of liquidity and return on equity of the banking 
system after the imposition of sanctions. 
• Analyze the state of the Russian banking system before and after the Introduction 
of sanctions by using (ROE) model.  
1.5 Research question 
The main research questions are:  
 
• How effective sanctions are in general? 
• What was the situation of credit institutions before the sanctions? 
• Did sanctions affect the banking industry in Russia? 
• What is the situation of banking sector after the sanctions? 
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1.6 Information and empirical basis 
The focus of the research is to determine the impact of sanctions on the banking system of 
Russia, by analyzing the state of banking system before the introduction of sanctions and 
after the sanctions. The study information will be acquired from published online sources, 
the materials of the Bank of Russia, the Federal Service for State Statistics of the Russian 
Federation, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, the official 
accounts of commercial banks, the resources of official Internet sites, with  the support of 
secondary sources, such as academic and literary review , as well as personal observations 
of the author that will serve as an informational and empirical basis for thesis.  
The purpose of thesis work is to determine the impact of sanctions on the banking system 
of Russia. There are limitations of acquiring the data of Russian banks, because it is not 
available in some cases. In the research we will concentrate on 7 sanction banks (Sberbank 
of Russia, VTB bank, Gazprom Banks, Bank of Moscow, Rosselhoz Bank, and SMP Bank) 
and 5 non sanction banks (Rosbank, UniCredit, Raiffeisen Bank, CitiBank, Bank of Saint 
Petersburg). In the study of the work, the following tasks will be solved: the identified 
concept and types of sanctions, the analyzed state of the Russian banking sector, prior to 
the adoption of sanctions and after, an economic study will conduct the impact of sanctions 
on Russia's banking sector through liquidity and return on equity(ROE). 
2 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research method 
Research method means gathering information or materials that will be afterwards ana-
lyzed by the researcher (Anselm Straus, Grounded theory research,1987, p.20). 
 
Quantitative research is a type of research where related number of amounts went through 
some method and calculations give certain numerical data that determine the relationship 
between independent variables. (Cambridge Dictionary Online) 
 
                                                            
 
10 
 
Qualitative research is a type of research that targets to get people's assumption and what 
they feel about it rather than information that can efficiently be demonstrated in numbers: 
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2013). 
Secondary data is data, which is publicly available and analyzed by someone else, it refers 
to the data collected by someone else like published books, magazines, newspapers bank 
financial reports. (Cambridge Dictionary Online) 
Primary Data refers to when data is collected by researcher himself by using interview 
method, questionnaire method, projective techniques and so on. (USC Libraries Research 
guide 10.12.2019) 
Qualitative research will be mostly used in first part of thesis-chapter two, to answer the 
question if sanctions are effective in general, with support of quantitative financial data 
displayed in tables, that will show the change in cost for the sender of sanction countries, 
and success index of sanction itself. 
The quantitative research will be conducted by making calculations on data available on 
the official bank pages and annual report received from Central bank of Russia and the 
banks under the sanctions and non-sanction banks. Empirical result for the chapter three 
and four is based on both, primary and secondary data. 
ROE – Return on Equity formula will be used in the thesis to make important calculations 
that reveal the real situation of banking sector of Russia, because ROE is  the most adequate 
formula that reveals the real usage of finance in difficult situations, if money is reinvested 
to the company for the further development, it shows that the shareholders believe in po-
tential of the company , if money is taken out from the company and not reinvested in it, it 
shows pessimistic mood of the company shareholders for the company. 
The thesis is divided into 8 chapters. First chapter consist of introduction, aim of the re-
search, explains the purpose of the thesis, as well as the history of sanctions in general and 
background of the sanctions imposed against Russia. Chapter two consists of method that 
is used in the thesis and explanation about background of empirical data. Third chapter 
presents theoretical framework and some background of sanctions. Chapter four presents 
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the state of banking sector if Russia before the implication of sanctions. Chapter five fo-
cuses more on the sanctions against Russia and displays the chronology of sanctions. Chap-
ter six consists of the discussion and calculations on what happened to banking system of 
Russia after the imposition of sanctions. Chapter seven consists of discussion and conclu-
sion, and overall thoughts of the author. And the last part consists of list of references and 
bibliography used. 
2.2 What is ROE  
ROE = (Net Income / Shareholders’ Equity) *100% 
ROE gives an easy and measured assessment of returns of company by analyzing a com-
pany’s return on equity to the corporation’s median, something may be diagnosed regard-
ing the corporation’s position, ROE can also give idea about how smart corporations man-
agement uses the income they received. 
A stable and growing ROE over time means a corporation is smart enough at generating 
profit from shareholder value, on the other hand a declining ROE can mean that manage-
ment of company is executing bad decisions on reinvesting money in ineffective assets. 
2.3 How ROE works 
More than 1 % = week effect on the ROE  
𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔′ 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚
=× 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
If there is a difference on return eq-
uity ratio average before and after the 
imposition of sanctions over 1 % 
positive, for both sanctioned and 
non-sanction banks, the effect is mi-
nor 
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Table 1. How ROE method will be used in thesis 
Regarding the hypothesis presented in table 1. This is an attempt by the author to demon-
strate (ROE) as a percentage, so that the reader can see the difference in average return on 
equity for sanctioned and non-sanction banks. it is chosen as an example and can be 
changed to other independent variables. 
In the research process special attention will be paid to the depts of the banks, according to 
the results of the ROE model, the higher the financial leverage, the lower the return on 
equity is. For example, In addition, the higher the level of doubtful debt, the lower the value 
of profitability. In our case, when making calculations, the profitability index will decrease, 
if bank has loans from the Central Bank of Russia, because sanctions imposed on the bank, 
forces the bank to take loans from the central bank. 
 An increase in the level of doubtful debts affects the size of the bank’s net profit, since 
due to non-receipt of money on loans the bank loses part of its income, and the loss of 
income is a decrease in profitability and ROE model displays it . Regarding the availability 
of loans from the Bank of Russia, we can assume that this is some indirect influence on the 
ROE and indicator of the weakness of the bank because of its need for state support. That’s 
the reason thesis does not rely blindly on ROE, but also will pay attentions to the depts of 
the banks too. 
Let us admit that two companies have the same sum of assets (1000 euros) and the same 
net income (120 euros) but different levels of debt: Company A has 500 euros in debt and 
therefore 500 euros in shareholders' equity (1000 - 500), while Company B has 200 euros 
in debt and 800 euros in shareholders' equity (1000 - 200). Company A shows a ROE of 
24% (120/500) while Company B, with less debt, shows a ROE of 15% (120/800). Because 
ROE equals net income divided by the equity, company A, the higher-debt firm, shows the 
Less than 1 % = strong effect on ROE 
𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 𝒐𝒏 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒔′ 𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒚
=× 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
If effect on return on equity average 
is below 1% negative, for both sanc-
tioned and no-sanction banks, the ef-
fect is sensitive 
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highest return on equity. Company A looks very good if we look at ROE, but it has higher 
profitability when it just has more obligations in dept. So, higher ROE doesn’t display the 
real picture, if you don’t check the obligations of the company behind it, therefore, it can 
be future problem for the company A.  (Hargrave Marshal, Corporate Finance & Account-
ing Jun 25.06.2019).   
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 The concept and types of sanctions  
Sanctions are one-sided or crowd methods to change behavior of individuals or govern-
ment, kind of tool to stop a country from violating rules set by international community 
(Dajani, Daoudi 1983). 
A different meaning of the sanctions that are presented in many other authors works, was 
that sanctions are more a kind of message to the rest of the world that such actions will be 
stopped by international community rather a real working tool that changes a country under 
the sanctions to change its behavior and act in favor of the senders of the sanctions.( Chan 
2000, Lindsey 1986) 
There is a known fact of sanctions imposed in old times, old Greece made an embargo for 
Megara region and their trade activities were blocked by the Greece a long time ago, but 
these kinds of sanctions were very few times at that time. More active embargos and sanc-
tions took place in new history, most of them happened in between 1800 – 2000.  
Mostly, the powerful and wealthy countries use these kinds of embargos and sanctions to 
target country to change their behavior or to get some beneficial position in certain cases; 
it can be import quotas, some tax cuts, and better conditions for the business in favor for 
the country that sends these sanctions. Weaker countries are forced to follow the rules set 
by the wealthy countries otherwise their economy suffers from the embargos and many 
kinds of restrictions that can be used against them.  
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The first recorded attempt to organize a "peaceful blockade" was carried out in 1827 during 
the struggle for the independence of Greece from Turkey. The French, Russian and English 
military forces blockaded the Greek coast to prevent military support for the forces of Tur-
key and Egypt. None of the organizing countries of the blockade was at war with Turkey, 
while the fleet was ordered not to open fire at the Turkish and Egyptian , however, the 
order was violated and, as a result, almost the entire fleet of Turkey and Egypt was sunk. 
Thus, the first attempt at a “peaceful blockade” failed. 
After the first “peaceful blockade”, another 21 similar blockades were organized. The main 
participants in the blockades were the largest and most developed countries in Europe, 
choosing smaller countries in Europe or developing countries in Latin America and Asia, 
for example, Portugal in 1831, the Netherlands in 1832–1833, and Brazil in 1862–1863, 
China in 1884–1885, Venezuela in 1902–1903 and other countries. Initiating countries in-
cluded such countries as United Kingdom sent them 12 times, Italy and Germany 3 times, 
Russia sent them 2 times, Austria 2 times, France 11 times. In all these cases most of the 
countries acted as an individual actor, very few of them were made as a group action of 
sanctioning. (Kramarenko Kseniya, Hogan 1908)  
Before the United Nations was created in 1945, no one controlled the sanctioning process 
and there were no rules and regulations regarding the sanctions. Any powerful country 
could send their sanctions, trade embargos, to a weaker country and make them suffer many 
years like in case of Libya when it was under the sanctions over 30 years, but later the UN 
took it under control and made clear in the legislation in which situation a country could 
be a subject for sanctioning, the circumstances in which the country could send legal sanc-
tions was noted in legislation, otherwise the sender country could get the punishment from 
international community. The process of legislatively determining the conditions and pen-
alties for sanctions means that all countries formally put the sanctioning in the list of in-
struments of political and economic influence. (Naumova Irina, 2018)   
According to Huffbouer, progressive evolution of the sanctions started after World War 2. 
in the 1950s, sanctions were imposed 15 times, in the 1960s there was 20 cases of registered 
sanctions, in the 1970s. - 37 cases of sanctions were registered, as well as 23 times in the 
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1980s, additionally, there were  50 registered sanction in the 1990s (Hufbauer, Schott, El-
liott, 1990). 
Types of Economic Sanctions:  
• Banking Industry – Financial Transactions 
• Basic Consumer Goods 
• Petroleum - Oils Exports  
• Weapons  
• Raw Materials for Manufacturing 
• Technology  
3.2 Evolution of Sanctions  
The imposition of economic sanctions has increased dramatically in the aftermath of World 
War 2. Including the eleven cases of sanctions imposed by the United Nations, often with 
participance of  United States, Between 1900 to 1990, the majority of sanctions were im-
posed unilaterally, most frequently by the United States, but in the 1990s, a large fraction 
were imposed by intergovernmental coalitions. The countries of Western Europe, espe-
cially the United Kingdom, are playing a more active role, but these coalitions usually 
included, if they were not originated by, the United States. (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot,1990, 
p 33; Elliot & Hufbauer, 1999, p. 404).  
 
The research reveals that the governments and coalitions use sanctions to try to change the 
strategic decisions of state and non-state bodies that intimidate their interests or disobey 
international law. Some researchers like Pape R. Say sanctions are very ineffective rarely 
successful in changing a target’s behavior, while Hufbour states sanctions are effective to 
some extent, and they have become more effective in last years and continue to be funda-
mental for the foreign policy. Sanctions have become the determined tool of the Western 
countries to respond to the challenges, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.  
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However, sanctions have been a strong, and widely used method throughout the years, 
imposed by different governments and followed by various reasoning behind them. Ac-
cording to the graph by Lance Davis and Stanley Engelman (Davis & Engelman 2003), the 
average number of costs to the target and sender, the index of the success, and the average 
number of cases of sanctions, show the actual numbers behind the history of sanctioning. 
3.3 How Effective Sanctions 
The peculiarity of applying sanctions is that it is very rare when one type of sanction is 
used, often it is several types of sanctions. There is a very typical case when sanctioning is 
made as a group action it’s believed that group actions are more affective. Accordingly, 
it’s also problematic to a group-sender to have some mutual standard of sanctions because 
all these countries have different relations with target countries and some country might 
have a good business with a targeted country thus, it loses more than other actors.  
 
Let us dwell in more detail on economic sanctions (trade and financial). Economic sanc-
tions are prohibitive economic used by one side or group of sides against another side-the 
receiver of sanctions. With the aim of forcing a change in political course. (Naumova Irina 
2019) 
 
There have not been many examples very successful sanctions in, and that makes the re-
search work a bit harder, because there is nothing to compare with.  Examples of economic 
sanctions include sanctions against countries in South Africa, Libya and Iraq. All three 
examples had something in common, they were all controlled by dictators they were not 
very powerful in economic since, and the economy of these countries was very dependent 
from exports of the raw materials, Iraq is more likely good example in our case, because it 
was also very dependent on oil exports. 
 
Economic sanctions against the countries of South Africa were introduced for almost 50 
years - 1948¬ 1994. and were aimed at a complete change in the political regime of the 
countries of South Africa. The sanctions included a ban on issuing loans to sanctioned 
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countries by the Export-Import Bank, a ban on the purchase of South African gold and an 
oil embargo. As a result, sanctions included restrictions on importing and exporting raw 
materials, military equipment, agriculture and technology stuff, oil extracting equipment, 
military-industrial complex goods. The result of the application of sanctions was a change 
in the political regime of the country, the countries that initiated the sanctions, and in the 
process, more and more new countries joined the USA and achieved their original goals. 
But should be emphasized that sanctions lasted 50 years, which erodes the possibility of 
analyzing the real picture on how effective sanctions are.  
Libya suffered from American sanctions for 30 years when in 1969 the USA directed sanc-
tions against a certain industry (sectoral sanctions), namely, oil, however, all related infra-
structure, equipment for extraction and oil refining, transportation, also fell under the in-
fluence. (Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot,1990) 
The result of the application of sanctions was a change in the political regime of Libya, but 
this also happened after a very long time, namely only in 2003, thus, economic sanctions 
against Libya lasted about 35 years. 
 
Hoffbouer notes, Regarding the sanctions that took place in Iraq in 1990 , actions were 
implemented on freeze foreign assets of the government, to impose an embargo on the 
products of the oil and military industries (to export products from other countries to Iraq), 
And ban on any activities including the banking operations. Nevertheless, finally the USA 
government had to admit that sanctions didn’t give an expected result and George Bush 
decided to make more effective actions and started war against Saddam Hussein.   
 
All these three cases demonstrate very clearly that the result of sanctions cannot be pre-
dicted beforehand, even though they look very similar to each other, and were under dicta-
torship, all three were very dependent on raw materials but still the sanctions didn’t give 
expected result. Only after starting war and invading the country and killing Saddam Hus-
sein, The USA could change political behavior of Iraq, which lasted a few years but now 
became even worth than it ever was. 
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Table 2. Cases of registered Economic Sanctions 1911-2000 source: Hufbauer & Scott & 
Elliot  
 
Most of the researchers who investigated the all possible kind of sanctions agree that sanc-
tions are not generally effective. Huffbouer notes, that only fifty percent of sanctions are 
effective when they are imposed against friendly countries, the percentage decreases to 
thirty percent in case when sanctions imposed against neutral countries, and it decreases to 
nineteen percent in case of enemy countries. His opponent Pape says that sanctions are 
literally waste of time and resources, and states that sanctions are not effective at all. In the 
article “Economic sanction and the paradox of sanctions: a post-random test of the Daniel 
Dresner (1999) 
Pape shares his thoughts about Huffbour’s investigation of sanctions mentioned in his book 
“Economic Sanctions Reconsidered”, in his book “Why economic sanctions don’t work” 
(1997), Pape states proves that only five out of forty cases of sanctions in Huffbour’s book 
are effective to some extent.  
      Years                            Cases of Economic Sanctions 
1911-1915 
 
 
                                                                                    1 
1 
1916-1920                                                                                     2 
1921-1925                                                                                     2 
1926-1930                                                                                     0 
 
1931-1935                                                                                       3 
1936-1940                                                                                     3 
1941-1945                                                                                     1 
1946-1950                                                                                     8 
1951-1955                                                                                     5 
1956-1960                                                                                    10 
1961-1965                                                                                    15 
1966-1970                                                                                     5 
1971-1975                                                                                    13 
1976-1980                                                                                    24 
1981-1985                                                                                     8 
1986-1990                                                                                    15 
1991-1995                                                                                    34 
1996-2000                                                                                    20 
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Thus, according to the data of Pope R. A., less than 5% of all sanctions are effective, which 
generally allows us to conclude that they are ineffective. Regarding other cases, Pape gave 
the following comments: 6 cases cannot be classified as sanctions; 18 cases are examples 
of force impact than the sanctions themselves; for 8 cases, there is no reason to believe that 
the target country is really inferior under the pressure of sanctions; 3 cases are uncertain. 
List of successful sanctions according to Hoffbauer (See Table 3). 
 
Table 3.. Sussessful Sanctions                                        source: Hofbauer, Schott, Elliot 
 
The effectiveness of the sanctions lies in the fact that the initiating countries have imple-
mented such an impact on the economic and political regime of the target country that it 
refuses or changes its political behavior. There are a lot of disputes whether sanctions are 
effective or not, it has not been clearly determined how effective the application of sanc-
tions yet. 
The dispute on how effective sanctions are in general is continuing from 1930th till now, 
and many authors like; Huffbouer, Elliot, Pape, Drezner are arguing about the reasoning 
behind the sanctions and their effectiveness for many years.  
The success or failure of sanctions determined by these researchers follows below:  
1. Disproportion of cooperation by the group of senders of the sanctions and minor effort 
to make real pressure on targeted country;  
maintaining sanctions, lack of support from other states; 
Target       amount of sanctions                  success 
Political reasons                                 43                           51% 
Changing ruling regime                                 80                           31% 
Stop War                                 19                           21% 
Destroying military potential                                 29                           31% 
Changing course of country politic                                 33                           30% 
Result                                 204                          32,8% 
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2. The effect of uniting the population of the target country and popular support of the 
government; 
3. Wrong effect -When two superpower are interested in different result for certain coun-
try the result from sanctions changes very quickly, for instance when Soviet Union im-
posed sanctions in Yugoslavia, the United States started to help economically and mili-
tarily and expanded its influence in Yugoslavia and these sanctions gave kind of better 
position to Yugoslavia than before the sanctions. 
Or in case of Cuba when United States imposed sanctions and all kind of embargoes 
against Cuba and Fidel Castro, Soviet Union started actively to expand their influence in 
Cuba started to cooperate with Cuba in agriculture, military and financially.  
4. Minor Cooperation from allies, when needed making sanctions on certain country 
All types of sanctions are characterized by the following parameters: 
• Recurring costs for the initiating country 
• The effect of sanctions on the target country 
• International sanctioning 
Hofbour, Schott and Elliot note that, in assessing the performance of sanctions the most 
crucial thing is the cost that country pays to achieve the expected result. It might look 
strange, but this is very important that there is the cost that must be paid to get the result. 
Otherwise, any country wishing to get a better position in certain business, would imple-
ment the sanctions on its neighbor or enemy country and it would lose the competitors, 
thus , understanding the fact that sanctioning without serious reason behind it can give side 
effect to the sender of the sanctions , countries will be more careful and will not play with 
sanctions.  
In the book of “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered” Hoffbouer checked more than 200 
cases of implementation of sanctions in the world and noted that usually there is very minor 
or no cost at all for the sender country if country is wealthy enough. Only 30 percent of 
sanctioning gave the expected result in history of sanctions. Huffbouer demonstrated very 
useful method to assess the cost and success index of sanctions in his book.  
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Some of the results obtained by Hoffbauer, Schott and Elliott are presented in the table 
below (See Table 4). 
Table 4. Success Index                                                        source: Hufbouer, Schott, Elliott 
                   
                     The Success Index 
Huffbouer presented the assessment of success index in his book “Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered” (1985), it included direct and indirect cost for the sender country and dis-
plays in numbers, if the aim was achieved Huffbour measures the success index from 1 to 
16 where 1 means not effective at all and 16 means very effective sanction.  
He also measured the cost for the sender country, not only the success it was presented in 
a way that what amount of cost was given to achieve the successful result for the sender of 
the sanctions the values, were set in a way from 1 to 4:1 – where 1 displays minor cost and 
for demonstrates sensitive cost for the initiating country, 2 - low costs; 3 - average costs, 4 
- significant costs. 
Senders—Receivers Years The cost for senders Sanctions effect index of success 
United Kingdom-Germany 1914-1918 4 7,1% 12 
United Kingdom- Russia 1918-1920 3 4,1% 1 
United Kingdom, UN- Iran 1951-1953 1 14,3% 12 
UN-Laos 1956-1962 1 4,2% 9 
UN-Cuba 1960 3 4,4% 1 
UN-Indonesia 1963-1966 1 2,0% 8 
China-Albania 1978-1983 2 3,3% 1 
UN-Iran 1979-1981 3 3,8% 12 
UN-Panama 1987-1990 3 6,0% 4 
South Africa- Lesota 1982-1986 2 5,1% 16 
India-Nepal 1989-1990 2 4,6% 9 
Average  2 6,6% 7 
Median  2 4,0% 8 
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4 THE STATE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM OF RUSSIA BEFORE 
THE SANCTIONS 
4.1 Key numbers of banking sector 
According to the Central bank of Russian data, from 2000 until the mid of 2013, the bank-
ing system of Russia shows dynamic growth, due to the following factors: 
1. The weak financing and minor participation of investment in economy, 
and growing demand of financial inflows for small and medium-sized en-
terprises.  
2. The weakening of national currency which is too dependent on the oil 
prices 
3. The weak international inflows of finance  
 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2014 the problems in Russian economy started to decline 
in liquidity ratios of banking sector, what was understandable due to economic problems 
that EU made to Russia in 2014. Before the sanctions there was some positive dynamics in 
GDP of Russia, it was slowly increasing from 70 to 80 percent in 2013. It is not very sig-
nificant increase, if you compare it with GDPs of other big countries, but it was kind of 
positive dynamic for the Russian economy, if you compare it to the situation now. Regard-
ing  In the assets, the share of loans granted increased insignificantly from 54 % in 2009 to 
56 % in 2013, and in the liabilities the share of the volume of borrowed funds from indi-
viduals and legal entities increased from 57 % in 2009 to 60% in 2013(Central Bank of 
Russia 2009-2013).  
Table 5.Ratio of banking sector performance indicators to Russia's GDP and banking sec-
tor as-sets 2009–2013                                                  source: Central Bank of Russia 
index 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Assets to GDP, % 75,8% 73,0% 74,4% 79,6% 80,6% 
Capital to banking sector assets % 15,7% 14,0% 12,6% 12,3% 12,3% 
The volume of loans given  54,8% 53,7% 55,9% 56,0% 56,5% 
The amount of funds raised from in-
dividuals % 
25,4% 29,0% 28,5% 28,8% 29,5% 
Amo nt of funds from legal entities, 
% 
32,5% 32,9% 33,6% 31,6% 31,0% 
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The decline in GDP growth began in 2011, right after the fall in economy GDP started do 
decline there was a loss in GDD for 3, 5% in just one-year time, 2010-2011. GDP fall 
was again in 2013, when it fell to 1, 3%. A decrease in fixed assets also fell from 6 to 1,4 
percent at the end of 2013. 
From 2011 to February 2014, the situation was relatively stable regarding currency and 
ruble position. However, from the middle of 2014, oil prices began to fall, respectively, the 
strongest weakening of the ruble exchange rate. (Bloomberg.com, 10.12. 2013) 
More detailed description of the dynamics of the ruble against the US dollar is shown below 
(See Figure 1). 
 
The central Bank of Russia tightened the rules and regulations, after the imposition of 
sanctions by Western countries, for the banks with small capital it gave negative reactions 
and a lot of them lost their accreditation from bank of Russia.  
 The dynamics of the number of credit organizations is presented in the figure below (See 
Figure 2). 
Figure 1.. Ruble to dollar exchange rate      source: Central Bank of Russia 
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Figure 2. Dynamic of credit institutions in Russia 2000-2013   Source: Central Bank of 
Russia 
4.2 Biggest banks ROE 
The biggest banks of Russia showed strong profitability until 2013, before severely break 
down in 2014.In 31 December 2014, ten of the biggest banks went back to the similar 
situation that they had in 2008 after the world crisis. The weighted average return on equity 
(ROE) of biggest 10 banks of Russia plunged dramatically in 2014 to 3.7 percent, down 
from16.8- 12.7 percent between 2010-2013 .The 2014 ROE ratio is 700 basis points lower 
after excluding Sberbank, illustrating the predominance of the market leader on the Russian 
banking market. source: (Delotte FSI CIS Analysis Center February 2016) 
The Dynamic of Sberbank key Figures given below (See table 6). 
 
Table 6. Dynamic of Sberbank key figures over the past five-year   Source: Financial re-
ports of Sberbank 
   
For the year RUB 
BLN 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Change % 
Operating income 733.7 915.3 1.094.8 1.300.7 1.429.8       9.9 
Provision changes 
for loan 
1.2 21.5 133.5 357.0 473.1       32.5 
Oper ting income 734.9 893.8 959.9 939.3 954.6       1.6 
Operating Expenses 339.2 445.9 504.2 565.1 623.4       10.2 
Profit before Tax 395.7 447.9 455.7 374.2 331.2      -11.5 
Net Profit 315.9 347.9 262.0 290.3 222.9      -23.2 
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In year to year finance reports, the biggest state owned bank of Russia -Sberbank displays 
overall situation in banking sector of Russia, as of 12.31.2014 Sberbank ROE is 14.8% 
in just one year it felt down to 10% in 2015, due to the ROE formula equations and cal-
culations made, and checked year to year reports of the banks, it was possible to analyze 
the liquidity state of sanctioned and non-sanctions banks, and based on the ROE method 
the picture becomes more clear, and most stable and unstable banks were identified. For 
the period 2011-2015 based on results, non-sanction banks are more stable in liquidity 
sense and sanctioned banks are more vulnerable. ROE ratio of banks under the sanctions 
show positive dynamic until 2014 and demonstrate negative results after 2014.More ex-
amples will be presented in next section. Profitability indicators given below (See Table 
7). 
Table 7. Profitability indicators for group of banks        Source: Central Bank of Russia 
Group of banks                     ROA                            ROE 
       2012                 2013          2012                     2013 
State banks       2,4%       2,2%          20.1%    18,3% 
Banks with foreign capital       2,5%       1,8%         18,8%    13,3% 
Biggest private banks      1,9%       1,5%         16,0%    12,5% 
Medium and small banks      1,6%       1,7%         9,6%    10,6% 
Financial ratio % 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Change 
Profitability ratios       
Return on assets (ROA) 3.2 2.7 2.2 1.4 0.9 -0.5 
Return on Equity (ROE) 28 24.2 20.8 14.8 10.2 -4.6 
Spread  6.1 5.8 5.7 5.5 4.1 -1.4 
Net interest margin 6.4 6.1 5.9 5.6 4.4 -1.2 
Operating expenses to operat-
ing income provisions 
46.2 48.7 46.1 43.4 43.6 0.2 
Loans and advances to Custom-
ers before provision for loan  
97.2 100.9 104.2 110.8 91.9 -18.9 
Per share, RUB  14.60 16.03 16.78 13.45 10.36 -23.0 
       
Basic and Diluted 
earnings 
0.9 2.1 2.6 3.2 0.5 -85.9 
Dividends per 
share 
58.7 75.2 87.5 94.0 110.5  17.6 
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Anyways the overall picture of Russian banks and economy as whole, were in a good 
shape until 2014, (Year of imposition of sanctions) after 2014 appeared some problems 
and decline in economy the growing concentration of the banking system at the largest 
and often state-owned banks, the outflow of deposits, which led to stagnation of the bank-
ing system, began to manifest themselves. 
5 SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 
As a result, from the research above, sanctions took place many times in history and they 
were used as an alternative to the war, much has been written on the effectiveness of inter-
national sanctions and on their success in achieving political objectives. International sanc-
tions against Russia – imposed in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea are 
supposed to make financial pressure on Russia and used as an alternative to war. Effective-
ness of sanctions regarding Russian banking system will be measured during the research 
process.   
Chronology of sanctions against Russia given bellow: 
 
• March 6, 2014: The United States issue a restriction measures on travel for Russian 
officials to the United States. And freeze the U.S. assets of those threatening the 
security of Ukraine. The state Department prepares visa restrictions on several of-
ficials and individuals. (Reuters and The Associated press) 
 
• March 17, 2014: The EU imposes travel restrictions and assets freezes on 21 indi-
viduals held responsible for the crisis, including the Speaker of the Crimean Parlia-
ment and several Russian MPs (OJEU, 2014). The scope of these penalties is the 
highest Russia has ever been issued since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Ka-
taev,2014). The U.S. expands the list of sanctions against Russia and Ukrainian 
officials (Reuters,2014). Canada also imposes economic sanctions against Russian 
officials involved in the crisis (PMOCSH, 2014). 
 
• March 18,2014: Japan freezes negotiations with Russia on matters regarding visa 
regulation, investments, military issues and space exploration (Shankar, 2014). 
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• March 19, 2014: Australia imposes travel bans and financial sanctions on 12 Rus-
sian individuals and officials. (Daniel Hurst, 2014). 
 
• March 20, 2014: The United States expand the list of sanctions yet again, to include 
20 members of Putin’s clique and Bank Rosia, because of its support for officials 
involved in the Crimea crisis. (JNM Journal, 2014). The EU also expands the list 
of individuals targeted by sanctions up to 33 persons. The G8 forum, over which 
Russia was supposed to participate, is suspended (CBC News, 2014). Moldova also 
joins the European Union in sanctions with travel bans and asset freezes on Russian 
officials and accused them in human rights violations. (Tele radio Moldova, 2014)  
 
• April 11, 2014: Norway, Montenegro, Iceland, Albania, and Ukraine impose sim-
ilar restrictions regarding travel bans and asset freezes as those imposed by the 
Council of European Union on March 17 (EU Council, 2014). 
 
• April 28, 2014: The U.S. usher in a new wave of penalties, freezing the assets of 7 
Russian individuals and 17 companies associated with Vladimir Putin, including 
Putin’s close adviser Sechin |Igor, and banning all kind of business transactions 
made by them. The European Union puts 15 further persons on its sanctions list 
(DeYoung, Birnbaum, 2014). 
 
 
• July 17, 2014: American sanctions target Russian’s, main oil producer - Rosneft, 
gas producer- Novatek and banks: Gazprombank and Vnesheconombank, closing 
possibility for long-term dollar funding (Reuters 2014). 
 
• July 24, 2014: Canada figures more sanctions on Russia, putting restrictions on   
financial and energy companies which somehow involved in financing rebels in 
Crimea.  (CBC News, 2014). 
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• July 25, 2014: The EU extends sanctions and puts another 15 persons and 18 com-
panies to its list of restrictions (OJEU, 2014).  
 
• July 30, 2014: The EU’s list widens by another 8 individuals and 3 companies 
(OJEU, 2014). 
 
• July 31, 2014: EU imposes more sanctions against the Russian financial institu-
tions, energy and military sector, new individuals and companies added to the asset 
freezing process (OJEU 2014). These measures are meant to curtail the ability of 
Russian banks to raise money on Western markets and to limit the transfer of mili-
tary or oil equipment to any Russian entity. The EU banks and companies are pro-
hibited from cooperating with Russian biggest banks (Sberbank, VTB Bank, Gaz-
prom bank, Vnesheconombank, Rosselkolkhozbank,). (Lewis, Santa, 2014) 
 
• August 5, 2014: New sanctions issued by Japan include freezing the Russian assets 
of 2 companies and 40 individuals, held responsible in the Crimea crisis. (Fackler, 
2014) 
 
• August 12, 2014: Norway supports the European Union in restrictions on the im-
port and export of arms and oil technology from and to Russian Federation (Off-
shore Energy Today, 2014). 
 
• August 14, 2014: Switzerland tightens military embargo on Russia. Switzerland 
had suspended the training of Russian military specialists on its territory and sup-
ported 5 of the 6 versions of the EU sanctions list (87 individuals and 20 compa-
nies). Furthermore, Ukraine levels sanctions against 172 individuals and 65 entities 
involved in the crisis (Radio free Europe, 2014). 
 
• August 27, 2014: The Swiss government decided to prohibit 5 Russian banks from 
issuing new long-term financial instruments, as well as banning business arrange-
ments with 11 Russian organizations and expanded the military embargo (McLu-
cas, 2014).  
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• September 12, 2014: The U.S. imposes new sanctions against Sberbank- Russia’s 
largest bank, and Rostec - a state corporation that specializes in the industrial and 
defense sector. American companies are also restricted from trading with 5 Russian 
oil and gas companies: Gazprom, Gazprom Nefs, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Ros-
neft. (Mohammed, Trott, 2014). 
 
• September 24, 2014: New Japaneese sanctions restrict the activities of Russian 
banks in Japan and tighten control on arms esport (BBC News, 2014).  
 
• December 18, 2014: The EU details further measures to be taken regarding Crimea, 
EU entities are restricted from purchasing real estate in Crimea and Sevastopol (RT, 
2014).  
 
• December 19, 2014: The U.S. Issues embargo on Crimea and levels new sanctions 
on Eastern Ukrainian separatist leaders. (The New York times, Peter Baker, 2014) 
 
• February 9, 2014: The Foreign Affairs Council added more restrictions on the Cri-
mea crisis, but delayed the implementation of these measures until February 16, 
due to the diplomatic debates in Minsk (Council of the EU, 2015). 
 
A brief description of Russian banks under the sanctions is given below: 
 
 
• Sberbank of Russia— Is one of the biggest and most popular banks in Russia, 
mostly owned by the government and offers different kind of banking services, it 
is present in most post-soviet countries like Azerbaijan , Kazakhstan, Georgia, 
and some European countries like Poland, Austria, Germany, Ukraine and Swit-
zerland. (Sberbank.com, Press releases, 01.22.2019). 
 
• VTB Bank — is the second largest Russian commercial bank with state participa-
tion. VTB Bank mostly operates in Russia and works with Government based com-
panies (Vtb.com, Press-Center 30.10.2019) 
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• Vnesheconombank — Group of Companies owned by state, Vnesheconom bank- 
Group of state-owned Companies, corporation involved in many government pro-
jects in the creation, and provision of conditions for economic growth and invest-
ment promotion. (SWFI Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 09.3.2015) 
 
 
• Gazprom Bank — is a gas based bank owned by Gazprom it’s well known bank 
in Russia, it offers huge variety of banking services it is present in all big cities of 
Russia and in all post-soviet countries, in addition, Gazprom bank participates in 
the capital of three foreign banks (Gazprombank.ru accessed 11.12.2019). 
 
• Bank of Moscow — is a Russian commercial bank working with legal entities and 
individuals. The Bank includes 267 separate divisions and has more than nine mil-
lion individuals and 114 thousand legal entities of customers. (Mkb.ru, general in-
formation) 
 
• Rosselkhoz Bank — is a fully state-owned Russian bank (100% of the shares are 
owned by the Russian government). The bank was created by order of the President 
of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in 2000 to service producers in the agricultural 
sector of Russia and as of 2014 the bank issued more than 2.3 trillion-ruble loans 
to agricultural companies. The Bank has 76 regional branches throughout almost 
the entire territory of Russia. (Bloomberg.com, RosselkhozBank profile) 
 
• VTB 24 — is one of the biggest Russian banks and daughter of VTB.The bank's 
branch network includes more than 1060 branches all over the Russia. Regarding 
the amount of deposits, and loans given to individuals and companies, the bank 
takes the second place in Russia, and the bank takes the second place regarding the 
issuance of mortgage loans and auto loans. (Emis.com EMIS, Bank VTB 24 
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• AB Russia— is a private Russian bank that provides a full range of banking ser-
vices for individuals and corporate clients. The territorial structure of the bank is 
represented in 25 biggest cities of the Russian Federation. (Alfabank.com, Corpo-
rate Profile) 
 
• SMP Bank — is a Russian bank, according to the results of 2014 presented in 
Central bank of Russia, occupies 26th place in Russia regarding net assets. The 
bank has about 100 offices in more than 40 biggest cities of Russia. SMP Bank is 
the parent bank of a financial group including, in addition to the rehabilitated Mo-
soblbank, Finansbusinessbank, Inresbank, also a leasing company and an insurer 
SMP Insurance; (Reuters, Bonds News April 29, 2014) 
 
 
• Sobinbank — is one of the biggest commercial banks owned by Bank of Russia. 
The bank’s service network consists of 24 branches. Since July 2014, the bank has 
closed all Moscow and several regional branches, sanctions are indicated as the 
reasons behind it. (Melissa Akin, Reuters, 10.16.2018) 
Next banks are not subject of the thesis work because VTB 24, is a daughter company of 
VTB, due to this it was excluded, Sobin bank and Vnechekonombank was excluded from 
the research work due to a lack of needed data online.  
There were some thought and disputes from well-known author who investigated sanctions, 
the background of sanction was introduced, sanction banks were identified that will be 
analyzed in the research, and overall picture of Russian banking sector before the imposi-
tion of sanctions was analyzed and presented in first part of the research. Next one will be 
more about getting the real numbers from calculation of bank data and ROE ratios of sanc-
tioned and non-sanction banks. 
For the reason, to assess the differences between banks under the sanctions and non-sec-
tional banks, will be used data of next five banks: UniCredit Bank, Raiffeisen bank, Ros-
bank, Saint Petersburg Bank, Citibank. All non-sanctioned banks are large banks that are 
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in the top 30 in terms of assets, and are also quite popular in Russia, some of these banks 
are banks with foreign capital (more than 50% of the bank’s charter capital belongs to a 
foreign company, a bank), such as JSC “ UniCredit Bank ”, JSC“ Raiffeisen bank,”  PJSC“ 
Rosbank ”, JSC“ Nordea Bank ”and JSC CB Citibank. 
Next banks are not subject of the thesis work, because VTB 24, is a daughter company of 
VTB, AB Bank, Vnechekonombank and SobinBank was excluded from the research work 
due to a lack of needed data online.  
A brief description of banks not under the sanctions is given below: 
• UniCredit is a leading European Commercial bank originally from Italy, success-
fully operating in 17 countries and it has 147 000 employees all over the world, 
over 8500 branches and with international network spanning in about 50 markets. 
(UniCreditbank.ru, Bank profile)  
 
• Raiffeisen Bank is global bank that operates as a corporate and investment bank. 
Raiffeisen offers corporate, and trade financing, investment banking, leasing ser-
vices, and custody services. Raiffeisen has branches in Austria and Central and 
Eastern Europe. (Rbinternational.com, Raiffeisen Bank International profile, De-
cember 2018) 
 
• Rosbank is a global bank and daughter of Societe Generale. It provides big variety 
of services to individual and companies. Rosbank has three million individual cli-
ents, about hundred thousand corporate clients. (Rosbank.ru, Company profile, ac-
cessed 11.12.2019) 
 
 
• Citibank is one of the biggest banks by capital in Russia. Services that Citibank of 
Russia offer to the clients cover all kind of cash administration, retail banking prod-
ucts, some insurance services, liquidity management, trade services, lending, com-
merce finance, treasury services, corporate finance, issuer services.  
(Citigroup.com, Corporate profile, accessed 10.12.2019) 
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• Bank of Saint Petersburg is the biggest privately-owned universal bank in Russia 
and plays a significant and positive role in the development of the Russian banking 
system. Bank Saint Petersburg is the 15th biggest bank regarding the assets and the 
15th largest by retail deposits among Russian banks. Bank of Saint Petersburg is 
the largest Russian regional bank with a strong and positive brand that has won the 
trust and support of its customers: today, the Bank provides services to two million 
individuals and fifty thousand companies. (Bsbp.ru, Bank of Saint Petersburg, pro-
file, 2019) 
The second part of the work will inspect the state of the banking system of Russia after 
the imposition of sanctions (2014–2015), for sanctioned and selected non-sanctioned 
banks separately, there will more detailed assessment of the effect on liquidity ratios from 
sanctions and on the Russian banking sector state after the imposition of sanctions , the 
data will be analyzed and presented in tables and figure, in order for assessing the influ-
ence of factors, including sanctions on the liquidity of the banking sector. 
6 THE STATE OF BANKING SYSTEM OF RUSSIA AFTER THE 
SANCTIONS  
The economic situation in banking sector of Russia in 2014-2015 was difficult, but the 
banking sector wasn’t the only suffering area, all the economic sectors are interconnected. 
The significant influence of geopolitical problems and a slowdown in Russia's GDP growth 
rates led the Russian economy to the phase of an economic crisis , which led economy to 
negative GDP growth rate, weakening of the ruble more than two times, inflation growth, 
outflow of private capital from Russia and other problems. 
The GDP growth rate in 2014 amounted to 0.6%, and at the end of 2015 it turned out to be 
negative, thus, Russia's GDP decreased by 3.7%. In 2015, consumer inflation at the end of 
the year amounted to 12.9%, whereas it was 11.4% in 2014. Real incomes of the population 
at the end of 2014 decreased by 0.7%, and at the end of 2015 fell by another 4.0% For 
2014–2015 the ruble weakened amid falling prices for crude oil. 
A big impact on Russian economy had the oil price that was continuously falling after 
2014 , all plans of the Russian government for the future was made in a way that the oil 
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price will not go lower than 100 per barrel but went down from 115 to 50 right after the 
sanctions in 2014. In January of 2016 a barrel of oil was 27 dollars per barrel; it was 20 
only in time of Boris Yeltsin when Russian had the worst economic situation ever. Now-
adays the oil price a bit up and floating between 40-60 dollars per barrel. Some countries 
like Turkey for example don’t extract and don’t export oil and their economy is mostly 
based on tourism, but in case of Russia one half of Russian economy is based on the 
income they get from oil exports. (Dreyer, Popescu 2014) To see the dynamic of crude 
oil price (See figure 4). 
 
  
Supplementary to the Russian economy is directly related to the oil prices, because the 
ruble falls exactly at the same time whenever oil price dropped. Additionally, when Russia 
got sanctions from Europe and USA the economy got into the sensitive decrease. All these 
factors made private sector and investors to take out their money out from Russian banks. 
(Reuters, 2015) 
Figure 3.Evolution of Brent oil price (USD/bbl.) Source: Invesdting.com (2016). 
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Should be noted that it is problematic to single out the effect of sanctions because the sanc-
tions were imposed almost at the same time when Russian economy was suffering from oil 
price fall, and with currency fall and problems in the economy, accordingly, during the 
sanctions all banks asked the Central Bank of Russia for help, with the exception of banks 
with foreign capital. 
Table 8. Return on Equity of Banks Under the Sanction   Source: own calculations from 
information of annual reports of banks in table 7. 
 
Table 9. Return on Equity of none Sanction Banks Source: Own Calculations relied on 
information from annual reports of banks in table 10. 
 
6.1 Sberbank ROE – Return on Equity  
Sberbank is one of the Russian biggest banks that display overall situation in banking sector 
of Russia, as of 12.31.2014 Sberbank ROE is 14.8% in just one year it felt down to 10% in 
2015 
Return on Equity (ROE) 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sberbank of Russia 24.2% 20.2% 14.8% 10.2% 
VTB Bank 16.8% 12 % 14.2% 0.01% 
Gazprombank 21.22% 18.02% 11.72% 10.60% 
Bank of Moscow 18.2% 20.1% 10.1% 2.1% 
Rosselkhoz Bank 16.1% 18.0% 13.0% 11.7% 
SMP Bank 16.60% 17.27% 11.10% 2.20% 
Return on Equity (ROE) 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Rosbank 4.22% 1.22% 3.0% 5.5% 
UniCredit 9.5% 13.2% 8.1% 16.42% 
CitiBank 6.9% 4.41% 6.60% 6.14% 
Bank of Petersburg 9.9% 15.2% 14.0% 9.5% 
Raiffeisen Bank 6.54% 5.41% 3.49% 3.89% 
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6.2 Gazprom bank ROE -Return on Equity  
As of 12.31.2014. Net income was 5.53 billion in dollars, and shareholders’ equity 30.05B 
so ROE was 11.72%, in 2015 in August Net income was 2.16 and shareholders’ equity 
19.94, ROE was 9.60%, as of 06.30.2016 the ROE was already 6.62%  
 
Figure 4. Year to year difference   source: Own calculations based on ROE of Banks 
According to the results (See figure 4.) All sanction banks worsened in 2014-2015 and 
show negative dynamic, whereas non sanction banks show mostly positive dynamic for the 
same period, there is negative dynamics of Reiffeisen Bank 0.4 % 2014-2015, but it is very 
minor, and was even more before the sanctions, so it could be assumed that this difference 
is normal for this bank. Bank of Saint Petersburg shows also a negative dynamic after the 
sanctions period, but it is considered minor because this bank had increase in ROE in 2014 
and it had 9.9% in 2012 too , this can be also assumed that this is a typical dynamic for this 
banks activities and not related to sanction period. 
As for the results of financial activities, there are differences for sanctioned and non-sanc-
tioned banks. Almost all banks in 2015 showed a deterioration in financial performance, 
however, among sanction banks, all banks worsened, and among non-sanctioned banks 
there were those that ended the year with a positive increase in profit. 
In 2015, all banks showed an increase in interest income and expenses, while at the same 
time interest expenses increased more than income. Note that interest income is income 
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from paid placement of own funds and borrowed resources of the bank. And interest ex-
penses are expenses on attracted resources, that is, payment for the use of attracted re-
sources in the form of interest payments. The main factor in the growth of this type of 
expenses was the increase in the key rate of the Russian Federation at the end of 2014. As 
a result, the interest income of commercial banks grew 2 times or more than interest in-
come, although interest rates on both loans and deposits increased. 
Fee and commission income and expenses of banks remained virtually unchanged; in 2015, 
it showed similar trends in previous years - 2013–2014. - a similar increase or decrease in 
income and expenses. Fee and commission income - income for the provision of non-credit 
services received by the bank in the form of a commission. Commission expenses are ex-
penses related to the payment of commissions for cash management services and certain 
types of operations, for example, with foreign currency or securities. 
The dynamics of the ROE indicator for sanctions and non-sanctions banks is presented in 
the figure below 
 
According to the results presented above, sanctions gave negative effect on the ROE of 
state-owned banks, while for private banks the effect of sanctions was negligible. Bank of 
Russia gave huge amount of credits to the banks under the sanctions to keep them floating 
whereas the private bank tried to keep themselves distanced from the credits of Bank of 
Figure 5. ROE Indicator Source: Bloomberg (2014). 
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Russia. It is problematic to point out the effect of sanctions, because sanctioned were im-
posed at the same time when Russian economy was in bad shape, there was a fall in oil 
price and national currency was suffering from oil price fall. Sanctioned banks return on 
equity ratio average turned negative in 2015, it amounted to –6.0% for sanction banks, 
while the unauthorized ROE remained positive for non-sanction banks and amounted to 
3.1%. 
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The research aim was to define the structure of sanctions in general, to get real picture of 
the popular author and get their idea, whether the sanctions are affective or not, detailed 
year to year analysis of the data of sanctioned and non-sanctions banks, plan a reasonable 
and extensive assessment of the influence of sanctions on the banking industry by using 
(ROE) ratio formula, develop methodological approaches to assess the liquidity state of the 
banking system, as one of the key indicators and conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
the impact of sanctions on the banking system of Russia by analyzing changes in the bal-
ance sheets, profitability ratios and indicators of the standards of sanctioned and non-sanc-
tioned banks, develop methodological approaches to assess the liquidity state of the bank-
ing system, as one of the key indicators, after the imposition of sanctions, build a model to 
assess the state of liquidity and return on equity of the banking system after the imposition 
of sanctions, analyze the state of the Russian banking system before and after the Introduc-
tion of sanctions by using (ROE) model.  
The main purpose of the thesis was to determine the impact of sanctions on the banking 
system of Russia. In the route of work, all the aim set were determined: the concept and 
types of sanctions were figured out, ways to determine the effectiveness of the impact of 
sanctions were investigated, the condition of the Russian banking sector was inspected, and 
the impact of sanctions on the Russian banking part was carried out through indicators of 
liquidity and return on equity (ROE) method. (See table 1). 
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Regarding the hypothesis presented in table 1. Whether the difference on return equity ratio 
average, before and after the imposition of sanctions over 1 % positive side, for both sanc-
tioned and non-sanction banks, or effect on return on equity average is below 1% negative 
side, for both sanctioned and no-sanction banks, the effect is sensitive. (See table 7 and 8) 
All sanction banks worsened in 2014-2015 and show negative dynamic, whereas non sanc-
tion banks show mostly positive dynamic for the same period, there is negative dynamics 
of Reiffeisen Bank 0.4 % 2014-2015, but it is very minor, and was even more before the 
sanctions, so it could be assumed that this difference is normal for this bank. Bank of Saint 
Petersburg shows also a negative dynamic after the sanctions period, but it is considered 
minor, because this bank had increase in ROE in 2014 and it had 9.9% in 2012 too , this 
can be also assumed that this is a typical dynamic for this banks activities and not related 
to sanction period. In just one year after the implementation of sanction the average ROE 
of banks under the sanction turned out to be negative and amounted to –6.0%, while the 
unauthorized ROE remained positive and amounted to 3.1%. Overall picture is so that, 
sanctions have a negative effect on the ROE of state banks, which are under the sanctions, 
while for private banks the effect of sanctions was minor.  
Overall picture of Russian economy after the imposition of sanctions is as follows- Russian 
economy is very dependent from oil price, and national plans for the future was made ac-
cording to the idea that oil price will not go lower than 100 dollars per barrel, but was it by 
coincidence or not, the oil price went as low as 45 dollars per barrel right after Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, and national currency of Russia which is very sensitive to oil prices 
went down when rubble was one euro — 42 rubles at the beginning of the 2013, in the 
middle of 2015 it was one euro — 82 rubles, and was one euro — 90 rubles sometimes and 
it stays at least one euro — 70 rubles after 2014 till now. National currency felt as low as 
twice, for the Russia , that imports everything except oil gas and military stuff, it was total 
disaster, because whatever was bought from outside the Russia any raw materials any in-
dustrial goods, like anything in a literal sense, lost the value twice, it was all bought by 
giving euros or dollar, not the Russian ruble, but they had to sell it for ruble in Russia, it  is 
not very profitable for the business, or they could keep it, but it would lose the value any-
way by depreciation or whatever. Thus, it is obvious that Russia’s economy got into real 
trouble as whole. 
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The effectiveness of the sanctions lies in the fact that the initiating countries have chosen 
and implemented such an impact on the economic and political regime of the target country 
that it refuses or significantly changes its political behavior. The first question – how ef-
fective sanctions in are general of the research is based mostly on contradictions of 
Hufbouer , who claims that 30 percent of sanctions are effective to some extent, and his 
opponent Pape R. States that  less than 5% of all sanctions are effective, which generally 
allows us to conclude that they are ineffective.  
From all the 115 cases that were investigating in research, the median cost index of sanc-
tions is 2 - insignificant costs, and the success index - 7, which characterizes the average 
efficiency of sanctions. The effect of the sanctions imposed as a percentage of the GDP of 
the target country is on average 6.6%. Thus, the authors concluded that for the most part, 
sanctions are characterized by relatively low costs for the initiating countries, however, and 
do not bring completely desired results.  
Regarding the second question - what was the situation of credit institutions before the 
sanctions. According to the numbers of the Central Bank of Russia the overall situation 
before the sanctions was positive for credit organizations in Russia. The situation started 
to change in at the end of 2014 inter banking activities slowed down as well as international 
banking cooperation on long term financing 
largest and often state-owned banks, and outflow deposits, starting to show stagnation of 
the banking system. 
Regarding the question three- did sanctions affect the banking industry in Russia? The GDP 
growth rate in amounted to 0.6% in 2014, at the end of 2015 it was negative, Russia's GDP 
decreased by 3.7%. Consumer inflation at the end of 2015 amounted to 12.9%, against 
11.4% in 2014. Real cash incomes of the population at the end of 2014 decreased by 0.7%, 
and at the end of 2015 fell by another 4.0% For 2014–2015 ruble weakened twice 2014–
2015. 
Regarding question four- what is the situation of banking sector after the sanctions? Despite 
the overall similarities, sanctions and non-sanction banks still have some differences in the 
dynamics of changes in indicators, sanction banks showed worse financial results com-
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pared to non-sanction banks, both in terms of profit and profitability. In addition, all sanc-
tioned banks showed loss in liquidity ratios in 2014, while non-sanctioned banks showed 
good dynamics, and sanctions did not significantly affect the dynamics of liquidity ratios 
of such banks. In general, studying the impact of sanctions on the banking system of Russia 
has many prospects for further research. 
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